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CASE NOTES
Tort Law-NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
-SHOULD THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT REPLACE THE IMPACT RULE
WITH A FORESEEABILITY ANALYSIS? Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d
348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
Karen Champion, the child of Joyce and Walton Champion, was
struck and killed by the defendant's automobile as she walked next
to a roadway. The defendant was intoxicated at the time he lost
control of his auto. Shortly following the accident, Joyce Champion
arrived at the scene and discovered the body of her daughter.
Overwhelmed by grief and shock at her tragic discovery, Joyce col-
lapsed and subsequently died. Walton Champion filed suit against
the defendant driver and the defendant insurance companies alleg-
ing that the deaths of his daughter and wife were directly and
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant.
The lawsuit filed on behalf of the deceased daughter was allowed
by the trial court.' In keeping with the requirements of Florida's
impact rule,2 however, the wife's suit for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was dismissed.8 The trial court found that be-
cause the defendant's negligent act resulted in no physical contact
upon Mrs. Champion, the impact rule mandated a denial of recov-
ery.' On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reluctantly af-
firmed the decision of the trial court in form but not in spirit.8
Dissatisfied with the injustice which resulted from the applica-
tion of the impact rule to this case, the court certified to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court the question of whether Florida should abro-
gate the impact rule.6 The court found it sensible and logical that
Florida align itself with the majority of jurisdictions which have
abandoned the impact rule7 inasmuch as many of the underlying
justifications for the rule have been repeatedly refuted.6 After ex-
amining the experiences of other jurisdictions, the court stated
that the elimination of the impact rule would not lead to an inun-
1. Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
2. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
3. Champion, 420 So. 2d at 349.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 354.
7. Id. at 350. See id. at 349 n.1 for the court's delineation of jurisdictions which have
abrogated the impact rule.
8. Id. at 350-51.
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dation of fraudulent claims of negligently inflicted mental dis-
tress,9 and that the reasons supporting the rule are shallow and
insufficient to justify the arbitrary denial of meritorious claims
based upon the fear that fictitious ones will slip past judicial scru-
tiny.10 The court concluded that such an expansive prohibition of
recovery to legitimate claims "does not comport with the justice
required by [Florida's] constitution.""
The court was careful to distinguish between recovery for a di-
rect victim who had suffered physical injuries due to negligently
inflicted mental distress, absent impact, and the recovery it pro-
posed to extend to a "bystander." In the former case, the court
stated simply that a direct victim should be able to maintain an
action for his mental distress without having to allege impact.'"
The court clearly rejected both the impact rule and the zone of
danger test' s as artificial impediments to meritorious claims."
These rules illogically presume that many fraudulent claims will
result if the defendant's liability is extended beyond impact or the
zone of danger to include the mental distress suffered by parents'
who have the misfortune of observing their child's violent death
from a safe distance.'5
The court suggested that the old-fashioned tort concepts of neg-
ligence and reasonable foreseeability be substituted for the anach-
ronistic impact rule. 6 -Specifically, it adopted the Dillon v. Legg
17
enunciation of the foreseeability analysis and the application of the
Dillon three-part test to the bystander setting.'8 The court stated
that under the foreseeability approach, Mrs. Champion might have
recovered because it was foreseeable that if one negligently oper-
ates a vehicle so as to injure someone, there would be other indi-
viduals emotionally attached to the injured person who would
thereby be affected.' 9 Additionally, the court recognized that the
9. Id. at 350.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 351.
12. Id. In the bystander setting, the plaintiff experiences no impact or fear for his safety
but suffers emotionally induced physical injuries at the sight of injury to a third person. Id.
13. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 350-52.
15. Id. at 350.
16. Id. at 352.
17. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (Cal. 1968).
18. Champion, 420 So. 2d at 353. For a statement of the Dillon test, see infra text ac-
companying note 95.
19. Id. at 352 (citing Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978)).
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emotional harm must manifest itself in a physical injury20
The purpose of this note is to explore the following issues: (1)
Should the Florida Supreme Court abrogate the impact rule? (2)
Under the facts of Champion, is the Dillon foreseeability approach
the most appropriate substitute for the impact rule? (3) Finally,
should Florida retain the physical injury requirement to prevent
the unlimited expansion of liability?
I. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
The recognition of negligent infliction of mental distress as a
cause of action is a recent development in tort law.21 Traditionally,
the fear of fictitious claims and the problems of medical proof are
two of a litany of reasons fervently chanted each time the question
of creating an independent tort for negligent infliction of emotional
distress is raised.22 Initially, the courts allowed recovery for emo-
tional distress arising as parasitic damages from the breach of an
independent common law duty2 3 Because the defendant owes a
primary duty not to unreasonably violate the physical integrity of
the plaintiff, any injuries suffered by the plaintiff due to a breach
of that duty provide a parasitic basis for recovering damages for
mental distress.2 4 While the rule of no recovery generally persisted,
the courts extended protection to mental distress when the dangers
of limitless liability and fictitious claims were outweighed by the
guarantee that the plaintiff's claim was genuine2 5 The courts fash-
ioned the traditional tests of impact and zone of danger, so that if
the plaintiff could show that he fell within the boundaries of these
tests, he could recover for his mental distress. The tests allowed
the courts to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims
and to prevent the imposition of liability on the negligent
tortfeasor disproportionate to the degree of his culpability. Some
jurisdictions found these tests to be poor measures of the defen-
dant's liability and actively harmful by denying meritorious claims
20. Id. at 353.
21. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 327 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
22. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn and Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897) (no recovery for
bodily injury caused by mere fright and mental disturbance); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.,
45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896), overruled, Battalla v. State, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (woman mis-
carried after near-collision with horse carriage-no recovery without "immediate personal
injury").
23. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 761 (Hawaii 1974). See 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1032 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
24. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 23, § 18.4, at 1032.
25. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 54, at 328.
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that failed to meet their arbitrary requirements. These courts rec-
ognized that a defendant has a duty to avoid the negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress and that a defendant's liability would be
measured by the general tort concept of foreseeability.2'
A. The Impact Rule
A century ago, the courts in England began to recognize the
need to provide compensation for physical injuries resulting from
the infliction of mental distress. Confronted with such problems as
the primitive medical knowledge existing in the field of mental
health and the possibility of fraudulent claims, the first courts de-
veloped a formula for measuring the limits of liability based on an
artificial barrier. Today, that formula is commonly known as the
impact rule,' characterized by the requirement "that absent phys-
ical impact upon the plaintiff, damages may not be recovered for
mental anguish or physical injury resulting from emotional stress
caused by the negligence of another."2
The impact rule is a product of English law, and was first recog-
nized in Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas.29 The
rule's precedential value was undermined only a few years later,
however, when the court opted for a zone of danger analysis rather
than the impact rule.30 Ultimately dissatisfied with both of these
tests, the King's Bench rejected them and molded a foreseeability
analysis to measure the boundaries of liability in mental distress
cases.
31
26. Leong, 520 P.2d at 762-6. See also Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Mich.
1970); Huges v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973).
27. To define impact as "physical impact" merely begs the question. Jurisdictions fol-
lowing the rule generally mean that the defendant's negligent act must result in a physical
"contact" with the plaintiff. See Arcia v. Altagracia Corp., 264 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA
1972) (plaintiff denied recovery because no impact occurred when falling plaster narrowly
missed her). But see Hoitt v. Lee's Propane Gas Service, Inc., 182 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA
1966), cert. denied, 188 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1966) (plaintiff granted recovery where gas tank
explosion had no impact on plaintiff but caused her to collide with another employee as she
fled from the scene). Thus, Florida courts will grant recovery if the impact directly causes
the plaintiff's injury or creates a situation in which injury is a foreseeable consequence of an
impact-generated series of events.
28. Champion, 420 So. 2d at 349.
29. 13 App. Cas. 405 (P.C. 1888).
30. Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 675 (1901).
31. Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, 1 K.B. 141 (1925). In Hambrook, plaintiff's wife saw
an unattended lorry rushing around a bend in the road towards the spot where she had left
her children. In fear for her children's safety, she rushed to the accident sight finding her
daughter seriously injured. The mother, pregnant at the time, lost her unborn child and
died from the shock resulting from the accident.
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New York became the first jurisdiction in the United States to
adopt the impact rule.3 2 Following the New York example, a num-
ber of other jurisdictions adopted the rule. As its shortcomings be-
came more evident, however, the majority of states employed other
standards for measuring liability.3 3 The reasons justifying the rule
are varied and they reflect a general reluctance by the courts to
expansively define the limits of liability.
One major rationale supporting the impact rule is the fear that
fraudulent claims will succeed because of the inability of medical
science to measure emotional injuries."4 It was thought that these
problems in medical diagnosis and causation might be avoided by
requiring impact as a guarantee of the genuineness of the emo-
tional distress.3" This rationale is a product of the nineteenth cen-
tury and fails to take into account the significant progress medical
science has made in the area of diagnosing the causal connection
between physical injuries and emotional injury.36 It also fails to
consider that emotional distress can result in illnesses comparable
in severity to physical injuries.3 7
Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the
traditional position that the uncertainty of medical proof of emo-
tional distress militates against recovery when he wrote:
It appears completely inconsistent to argue that the medical pro-
fession is absolutely unable to establish a causal connection in the
case where there is no impact at all but the slightest impact...
suddenly bestows upon our medical colleagues the knowledge and
facility to diagnose the causal connection between emotional
32. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896), overruled, Battalla v. State,
219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
33. Commentary, Torts: The Impact Rule - Nuisance or Necessity?, 25 U. FIA. L. Rav.
368, 375 (1973). Massachusetts should no longer be considered as an "impact" jurisdiction
since the rule was rejected in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978).
34. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897); Huston v. Freemans-
borough, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (Pa. 1905) (plaintiff's husband received shock from nearby explo-
sion of dynamite while recovering from typhoid fever and died two weeks later-recovery
denied as fright caused by explosion not connected with physical injury).
35. Charlie Stuart Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Smith, 357 N.E.2d 247, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976)
(no recovery allowed for mental distress as a result of negligent injury to automobile because
unaccompanied by physical injury).
36. See Green, Injuries From Fright Without Contact, 15 CLsV.-MAR. L. REv. 331, 335
(1966); Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).
37. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Hawaii 1970) (plaintiffs allowed recovery for
mental distress resulting from the flooding of their home).
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states and physical injuries."
Jurisdictions which have abandoned the impact rule are confident
in their ability to detect fraudulent claims of mental distress. Some
courts have determined that fraud in a "no-impact" jurisdiction
should be no more prevalent than in an "impact" jurisdiction as
evidence of "slight" impact can be readily manufactured. 9 Other
courts have shown that the inherent integrity of the court system,
based on sound rules of evidence, the concern of juries and the
knowledge of expert witnesses, acts to discover and discourage
fraudulent claims. " If the courts are satisfied that fraud can be
detected in cases of trivial impact, it seems logical that the same
judicial and medical competence can be applied to separate the
fraudulent from the meritorious claims in non-impact cases.
Proponents of the impact rule usually rely on the outmoded fear
that its abolition will open the flood gates of litigation."' This fear
simply has not been realized in those states which have abrogated
the rule; indeed, the greatest volume of litigation on emotional dis-
tress claims continues to be in those jurisdictions requiring im-
pact.42 It is not surprising that litigation and fraud would be more
prevalent in impact jurisdictions. The plaintiffs in these cases have
every incentive to perjure themselves "in constant attempts to fit
within [the impact rule]" or to litigate in order to alter the impact
rule.'
Stare decisis has been offered as another reason for retaining the
impact rule,4" but this argument overlooks the fact that stare deci-
sis is necessarily limited in the field of torts.45 Tort law is con-
stantly evolving as it attempts to measure the duties members of
society owe each other and the liabilities they will incur for the
breach of these duties. The courts should not allow stare decisis to
38. Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1970).
39. Chuichiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 150 A. 540, 543 (N.H. 1930); Savard v.
Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 234 A.2d 656, 659 (Vt. 1967).
40. Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 714 (Del. 1965) (woman fled from her car
to avoid being hit by a train-recovery allowed despite lack of impact); Falzone v. Busch,
214 A.2d 12, 16 (N.J. 1965) (plaintiff allowed to recover for injuries resulting from defen-
dants negligent handling of an automobile causing her to fear for her safety).
41. Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354.
42. First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324, 339 (Miss. 1975); Falzone, 214 A.2d at
16. See McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 1,
29-32 (1949).
43. Battalla, 219 N.Y.S. 2d at 37-38.
44. Huston v. Freemansborough, 61 A. at 1023.
45. Falzone, 214 A.2d at 17.
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inscribe formalistic and eternal commandments in the tablets of
the common law when the needs of justice mandate a change."6
The ultimate failure of the impact rule is that, as an artificial
barrier to undue liability, its mechanical application creates harsh
and unjust results. 47 Plaintiffs who are physically endangered by a
defendant's negligence or who witness an emotionally disturbing
accident cannot recover for their mental distress unless they can
prove the requisite "impact." Sensitive to the considerable injus-
tice the application of the rule generates, those jurisdictions retain-
ing the rule have gone to great lengths to find impact from "the
most trivial contact. '48 But not even refining the nature of the im-
pact requirement to include trivial contacts is sufficient to save the
rule. Including trivial impacts within the rule arguably only serves
to undermine its purpose; to guarantee the genuineness of the
plaintiffs' claims of mental distress. Trivial impacts make the
fraudulent manufacture of evidence to support the plaintiffs'
claims much simpler.
B. The Impact Rule in Florida
In International Ocean Telegraph v. Saunders,49 the Florida
Supreme Court apparently adopted an early version of the impact
rule. The plaintiff in that case sued the defendant for mental
anguish caused by the defendant's failure to promptly forward a
telegram describing the fatal condition of the plaintiff's wife.50 De-
spite the trend to allow recovery, absent impact, for mental dis-
tress resulting from the negligent handling of telegrams,51 the court
46. Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (N.Y. 1951).
47. As one Florida district court asked: "What therefore is so magical about 'impact'
that makes its presence a guarantee of the authenticity of mental disturbances but makes
its absence a supposed spawning ground for fakery?" Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466,
473, rev'd, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974). E.g. Carey v. Pure Distrib. Co., 124 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.
1939).
48. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928) (prancing circus
horse defecates in plaintiff's lap); Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 62 N.E. 737 (Mass. 1902)
(insignificant blow); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (dust from rail-
way bridge accident irritates eyes); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (inhalation of
smoke); Colla v. Mandella, 85 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Wis. 1957) (although impact held not to be
necessary, a truck hitting outside wall of room where plaintiff's husband was sleeping
thought to be enough).
49. 14 So. 148 (Fla. 1893).
50. Id.
51. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 53 So. 80 (Ala. 1910); Cumberland Tel. & Tel.
a Co. v. Quigley, 112 S.W. 897 (Ky. 1908); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 23 S.E.2d 681
(N.C. 1943); Connelly v. Western Union Co., 40 S.E. 618 (Va. 1902).
(1983]
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reasoned that mental distress posed "an insurmountable difficulty
to measure" and denied recovery because of the impossibility of
compensation. 2
Although several district courts of appeal have challenged the
rule,5 Florida continues to adhere to it. The impact rule was reaf-
firmed in Gilliam v. Stewart,54 where the defendants were negli-
gently driving their cars when the automobile collided on the street
near the plaintiff's home. The force of the accident propelled their
cars onto the plaintiff's front lawn, causing one car to strike a tree
and the other to strike the plaintiff's house. Plaintiff was lying in
bed when she heard the accident and the thud of the car striking
the house. Shortly following the accident, she experienced chest
pains for which she was hospitalized. Approximately a month later
plaintiff died from the heart attack caused by the excitement of
the accident. In reversing the decision of the lower court granting
recovery, the Florida Supreme Court gave little attention to Judge
Mager's convincing opinion in the district court of appeal for the
abolishment of the impact rule.5 The court did state, however,
given the right case, that "if this Court should reach the conclusion
that such rule was inequitable, impractical or no longer necessary,
it may be, judicially, altered or abolished."'56
More recently, one district court has indicated that even the im-
pact itself must be sufficiently substantial before the plaintiff can
recover.57 In Davis v. Sun First National Bank, the court denied
recovery to a bank teller in her suit against the bank for negligent
infliction of mental distress, holding that the act of a robber in
handing her a holdup note did not constitute physical impact.8 "
Under more compelling facts, the application of the impact rule
in Florida has resulted in grossly unfair and unjust results. In 1979,
the First District Court of Appeal reluctantly applied the impact
rule to deny recovery to relatives suffering emotional distress on
observing the decedent's casket fall apart while being transported
52. Saunders, 14 So. at 151. The court reasoned: "The resultant injury is one that soars
so exclusively within the realms of spirit land that it is beyond the reach of the courts to
deal with, or to compensate by any of the known standards of value." Id. at 152.
53. Champion, 420 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Johnson v. Herlong Aviation, Inc.,
271 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Stewart, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
54. 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
55. Id. at 595.
56. Id.
57. Davis v. Sun First Nat'l Bank, 408 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
58. Id. at 609-610.
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from the hearse to the grave." Given this factual setting, the im-
pact rule goes far beyond its goal of ensuring genuine claims and
acts as a total bar to all cases involving the negligent handling of
corpses where the plaintiffs have the misfortune of not being
struck by the body as it falls from the defectively manufactured
casket. Harvey Garod illustrates the consequences of the applica-
tion of the rule here:
The impact rule brings about peculiar results. It must be assumed
that none of Mrs. Harper's relatives were pallbearers. Had they
been, the collapsing coffin or descending body inside would have
provided sufficient impact upon the pallbearers to allow them to
bring in action for any mental disturbance they might have suf-
fered. Nonrelatives could sue, but the decedent's next of kin, who
merely had to watch this macabre event, could not.60
A more egregious result occurred in Woodman v. Dever."' The
plaintiff child, her sister and her mother were staying in the defen-
dant's motel when an intruder entered the room. As the child
watched, the intruder proceeded to rob and rape the mother. The
court denied recovery to the child for her emotional distress. In
applying the impact rule, the court found that the defendant had
not acted with malice, entire lack of care or great indifference for
the plaintiff's person which are the traditional Florida exceptions
to the rule."2
Florida courts have recognized the inapplicability of the impact
rule in two major areas. The rule has been suspended in cases
where the injury has resulted from an intentional infliction of
mental distress"' or in which the defendant acted maliciously."
The district court of appeal in Way v. Tampa Coca Cola Bottling
59. Estate of Harper v. Orlando Funeral Home Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979),
cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1980).
60. Garod, Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Intangible Damages, Fla. B.J. 708, 710
(October 1982).
61. 367 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
62. Id. at 1063.
63. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950). In Kirksey, the defendant transported
the plaintiff's decedent child to the defendant's funeral home without the plaintiff's authori-
zation. The defendant refused to return the body until the plaintiff paid an embalming fee.
Given the outrageous conduct of the defendant, the court permitted recovery. But see Es-
tate of Harper v. Orlando Funeral Home Inc., 366 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), where
recovery was denied for the negligent handling of the plaintiff's decedent mother because
the plaintiff failed to allege impact.
64. Note, Outmoded Impact Rule Retained by Florida, 28 U. MIAw L. Rav. 705, 706
(1974).
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Co.6 5 appears to have abandoned the 'impact requirement for
mental distress caused by the consumption of defectively packaged
foodstuffs. In Way, the plaintiff became severely nauseated when
he discovered an object resembling a hairless rat in the bottle of
Coca Cola he was drinking." In granting the plaintiff a recovery,
the court chose to follow Maine's lead6 7 by adopting a foreseeabil-
ity standard" in cases of mental distress stemming from this kind
of products liability.
Our courts have given comparatively little attention to the effect
of the impact rule in bystander cases such as Champion.9 The
view of the district court opinions dealing with bystander situa-
tions has been to deny recovery to the mentally distressed by-
stander. In City Stores v. Langer,70 for example, the plaintiff
sought relief for the pain, embarrassment and humiliation he suf-
fered on learning that his daughter had been arrested for shoplift-
ing.7 1 While not referring to the impact rule the court stated: "the
rule has been recognized that there can be no recovery by a parent
in action for injuries to his minor child, for the suffering, pain, em-
barrassment and/or humiliation caused the parent by the injuries
of the child. '7 2
By 1981, one district court had applied the impact rule to deny
recovery in a bystander case. In Selfe v. Smith7 3 the plaintiff and
her infant child were injured when the defendant's vehicle struck
the pickup truck in which they were riding.74 The plaintiff exper-
ienced mental distress on seeing the permanent facial injuries her
son suffered.75 The court found the source of the emotional distress
to be the sight of the child's injuries and stated:
But satisfying the "impact rule"-which is defended as verifying
otherwise problematic injuries, or as drawing a needed if some-
what arbitrary line between compensable injuries and those that
65. 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
66. Id.
67. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) (unpackaged
prophylactic in coke bottle). Wallace was overruled on other grounds in Culbert v. Samp-
son's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982). See infra note 163.
68. Way, 260 So. 2d at 290.
69. Champion, 420 So. 2d at 351.
70. 308 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
71. Id. at 622.
72. Id.
73. 397 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).




society requires be borne unrecompensed-until now has gained
plaintiff damages for only that mental distress which is due to
plaintiff's own injury, or to the traumatic event considered in re-
lation to plaintiff alone.7
The impact rule, however, has not served as an absolute bar to
recovery in "bystander" cases. In National Car Rental v. Bostic,77
the court creatively distinguished the Selfe decision to allow recov-
ery for the mental distress the plaintiff experienced at watching his
mother die slowly following a traffic accident. The car in which the
plaintiff and his mother were riding was struck by the defendant's
negligently driven vehicle. Because of the injuries he received, the
plaintiff was unable to comfort his mother in her final moments.75
The court granted recovery stating:
The evidence showed that Bostic's emotional problem was caused
by his inability to render aid and comfort to his mother because
of the injuries and impact suffered by Bostic which had rendered
him physically unable to come to her aid. Therefore, we find no
error in permitting into evidence testimony of Bostic's mental
pain and suffering caused by his being present when his mother
was killed.79
Neither Selfe nor National Car Rental provide grounds for Mrs.
Champion to recover for the mental distress she experienced on
seeing the body of her child. Under these cases, the bystander
must be a direct victim of the impact to recover. The injustice of
the rule is clear.
C. The Zone of Danger Test
The arbitrariness of the impact rule spurred some jurisdictions
to supplant it with the zone of danger test.80 This new creation
required only that the plaintiff be within the zone of peril of physi-
cal injury in order to recover for his mental distress." It was hailed
to be a significant improvement over the impact rule because it did
not preclude recovery in bystander cases in which the plaintiff al-
leges mental distress from witnessing injury or peril to a third per-
76. Id. at 350 (footnote omitted).
77. 423 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
78. Id. at 916.
79. Id. at 917.
80. See Tobin v. Grossman, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
81. Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W.497, 500-01 (Wis. 1935).
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son. Furthermore, it was believed the test would ensure the genu-
ineness of the plaintiff's claim as it is reasonably foreseeable that a
bystander plaintiff would suffer emotional distress if he feared for
his well-being.82
The zone of danger test, which has been adopted by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 83 has achieved wide spread popularity84 in
part because it seems to present a sensible solution to the problem
of unlimited liability. But this "sensible solution" has been re-
jected by some jurisdictions as a "hopeless artificiality"8 5 because
it denies recovery just as arbitrarily as the impact rule.88 Liability
under the test is not predicated on the consequences of the defen-
dant's negligence; rather, the test focuses on a geographic analysis
of the zone of danger in each case. Two bystanders may suffer
equally devastating emotional distress but only one may be able to
recover because of the mere fortuity of being several feet closer to
the accident and therefore within the zone of danger. Unjust con-
sequences inevitably result. While a relative could recover for the
negligent handling of a corpse, a mother who watched a nurse drop
her newborn baby to the floor was denied recovery for her mental
distress simply because she was outside the zone of danger.8 7
Dissenting in Stewart v. Gilliam,88 Justice Adkins urged the
Florida Supreme Court to adopt the zone of danger test. Justice
Adkins traced the origin and evolution of the impact rule and its
ultimate demise in other jurisdictions. He pointed out that even in
Florida there has been a gradual erosion of the "strict requirement
of impact."8 " Because the reasons underlying the rule lack the
force or logic of justice, he concluded that the zone of danger test
provides an equitable alternative to the rule.90 While Mrs. Stewart
could recover for her fright under the zone of danger test, it is
82. Bowman v. Williams, 165 A. 182, 184 (Md. 1933); Guilmette v. Alexander, 259 A.2d
12 (Vt. 1969).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (2) (1965). For an interesting discussion of
the zone of danger test, see Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emo-
tional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477 (1982).
84. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 23, § 18.4, at 1037 (1956). There is a split among
those jurisdictions retaining the zone of danger test. Some jurisdictions, as in Tobin, require
the plaintiff to have feared for his own safety. Others, as in Bowman, permit recovery for
plaintiffs within the zone of danger who feared for the well-being of another.
85. Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
86. Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1979).
87. Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
88. 291 So. 2d at 596.
89. Id. at 601.
90. Id. at 602.
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equally clear that such a test would deny recovery to Mrs. Cham-
pion because she was never within the area of physical risk. This
result defies explanation. What possible policy considerations can
justify compensation for Mrs. Stewart's injury and yet deny recov-
ery to Mrs. Champion who died from the grief of seeing the body
of her negligently killed daughter?
D. Foreseeability
Concer,~d over the inequities resulting from the mechanical ap-
plicatioiyof the traditional tests, the California Supreme Court re-
jected the zone of danger test in Dillon v. Legg"1 in favor of a fore-
seeability approach. The facts of Dillon were compelling. The
defendant killed a child with his car while the child's sister and
mother watched. By a distance of only a few feet, the sister was
found to be within the zone of danger but the mother was not.
The court permitted recovery for the mother because the dual
fears of fraud and unascertainable claims were not involved in this
factual setting. Fraud was minimized because there could be no
"doubt that a mother who sees her child killed will suffer physical
injury from shock." 92 Additionally, the court reasoned that the
mere possibility of fraud should not be used to strike down merito-
rious claims or to abandon the general tort principles of foresee-
ability and proximate cause.9 3 The court was satisfied that tradi-
tional tort principles would impose acceptable boundaries to
liability. It held that a defendant would be liable for injuries to
others if these injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the defen-
dant at the time of the negligent act.9 4 In determining if the defen-
dant should reasonably foresee an injury to the plaintiff, the court
established three major "guidelines:"
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the acci-
dent as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional im-
pact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident
from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of
91. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80-81 (Cal. 1968).
92. Id. at 77.
93. Id. at 78.
94. Id. at 79.
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only a distant relationship.2
The Champion court advocated a verbatim acceptance of the
Dillon test." The most obvious difficulty with this position is that
the Florida court accepted California's law as of 1968 without con-
sidering subsequent decisions of that state's courts interpreting the
Dillon guidelines. In fact, the general trend in California has been
to transform the flexible Dillon foreseeability guidelines into im-
mutable requirements, from which the slightest variation have re-
sults in a denial of recovery. A number of cases which have de-
voted considerable analysis to the Dillon guideline of
contemporaneous sensory perception of the injury-inducing event
have concluded that it is an absolute prerequisite to recovery, and
that plaintiffs who failed to prove this element are to be denied
recovery.9 7
Shortly after the Dillon decision, a California court of appeals
seemed to retreat from the contemporaneous sensory perception
requirement. In Archibald v. Braverman,98 plaintiff's son suffered
injuries requiring amputation after gunpowder unlawfully sold to
him by the defendant exploded. Within moments of the explosion,
the plaintiff arrived and suffered such severe shock at the sight of
her son's injuries that she had to be institutionalized.9 9 The court
allowed the plaintiff to recover for her mental distress because her
observation was sufficiently "contemporaneous" with the acci-
dent."'0 It interpreted the Dillon guideline to require that the
plaintiff actually witness the accident or, as in Archibald, that the
shock be "fairly contemporaneous with the accident."101
Archibald was distinguished in Arauz v. Gerhardt,10 2 in which
although Mrs. Arauz arrived at the scene within five minutes of the
accident that injured her son, the court denied recovery.103 A closer
reading of the Dillon guideline, the court said, would reveal that
'some type of sensory perception of the impact contemporaneous
* 95. Id. at 80.
96. Champion, 420 So. 2d at 353.
97. For a broad overview of the evolution of Dillon since its inception, see Nolan &
Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33
HASTING L.J. 582 (1982).
98. 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
99. Id. at 724.
100. Id. at 725.
101. Id.
102. 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
103. Id. at 627.
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with the accident is necessary to meet the Dillon requirement.' 0 4
This perception was absent in Arauz but existed in Archibald be-
cause the results of the explosion were so shocking that the plain-
tiff could "mentally reconstruct" the scene of the accident.'06
If the particular facts of a case failed to convince the court that
the plaintiff could have mentally visualized the accident, recovery
was denied regardless of how quickly the plaintiff arrived on the
scene of the injury. While the lapse of thirty to sixty minutes be-
tween the injury producing event and the plaintiff's discovery of it
was clearly beyond the Dillon guideline, 0 6 the passage of even a
moment or two has been held insufficient to justify recovery.1 0 7
The Archibald analysis surfaced later in Nazaroff v. Superior
Court.0 8 The plaintiffs infant son fell into a neighbor's pool as she
searched the neighborhood for him. Plaintiff heard the neighbor
cry, "it's Danny," and as she ran to the pool area she visualized
that Danny had injured himself in the pool. She arrived to see
Danny being pulled from the pool and subsequently suffered
mental distress. 09 Holding that a contemporaneous sensory obser-
vation was a question of fact, the court permitted recovery because
the plaintiff's visualization of the accident qualified as a Dillon
perception. 10 Further, because death by drowning is not instanta-
neous, it was possible that the boy was still experiencing his inju-
ries at the time the plaintiff entered the pool area."' Similarly, in
Krouse v. Graham,"1 the plaintiff was sitting in the driver's seat of
his car as his wife unloaded groceries from a rear door. The defen-
dant, driving negligently, struck the plaintiffs car from the rear
killing plaintiff's wife. Although plaintiff did not see his wife die,
he did see the defendant's car approach and realized that his wife
must have been injured. The court granted recovery, characterizing
the plaintiff as a percipient witness and noting that Dillon does
not demand actual visual observance of the event." 3
The California courts, however, have been unwilling to liberalize
104. Id.
105. Id. at 626.
106. Powers v. Sissoev, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868, 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
107. Parsons v. Superior Court for Cty. of Monterey, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495, 498 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978).
108. 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
109. Id. at 659.
110. Id. at 664.
111. Id.
112. 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Cal. 1977).
113. Id. at 872.
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the Dillon standard to grant recovery to meritorious claims when it
is unclear whether the plaintiff had sensorily perceived the acci-
dent. In Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, "' defen-
dant's physician negligently diagnosed and treated the plaintiff's
daughter, resulting in a slow death for the child. 15 Even though
the plaintiff observed her daughter's death, she was denied recov-
ery."' Dillon, the court reasoned, does not extend to a case involv-
ing the failure to diagnose or to negligently diagnose.1 17 Dillon re-
quires the injury inducing event, not the results of negligence, to
be capable of sensory perception and a mere "failure of diagnosis
... is not an event which can itself be perceived by the lay-
man."11 8 The court factually distinguished Archibald, by stating
that the plaintiff there had heard the explosion and therefore sen-
sorily perceived it.'1 9 Four years later the Jansen reasoning was
reflected in Justus v. Atchison.20 In Justus, the plaintiff was pre-
sent in a hospital delivery room while the defendant physician neg-
ligently tried to save the baby of plaintiff's wife. 2 ' The court
found that mere presence was insufficient, and the plaintiff must
have a sensory perception of the injury.1 22
Justus was not followed in the factually similar case of Mobaldi
v. Board of Regents of the University of California.1 23 In Mobaldi
a physician negligently injected plaintiff's son with a powerful glu-
cose solution and plaintiff witnessed her son suffer severe convul-
sions resulting in brain damage.1 24 The court overturned the trial
court demurrer despite the fact that the plaintiff was unaware that
defendant's negligence injured her son.12 5
The irony of these subsequent California decisions is that they
have molded Dillon's contemporaneous sensory observance stan-
dard into a barrier as arbitrary and artificial as the tests it was
meant to replace. Temporal and geographic proximity are pro-
moted again to be the prime determiners of liability, and those
114. 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
115. Id. at 884.




120. 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (Cal. 1977).
121. Id. at 99-100.
122. Id. at 110-11.
123. 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
124. Id. at 723.
125. Id. at 728.
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plaintiffs who fail to meet this requirement are denied recovery.
These results seem to violate the spirit and the intent of Dillon. If
the Florida Supreme Court adopts an unaltered version of Dillon,
as suggested by the district court, our courts may well be plunged
into the same quagmire in which the California courts find them-
selves. For Mrs. Champion, there still would be no recovery under
the contemporaneous sensory observance requirement.
In other jurisdictions Dillon has not been met with universal ac-
claim. Some jurisdictions flatly reject the foreseeability analysis.'
Expressing misgivings about the Dillon approach, New York opted
to retain the zone of danger test in Tobin v. Grossman.27 In that
case, the plaintiff suffered mental distress after arriving on the
scene of the child's injury. The court admitted that mental distress
was foreseeable to the defendant but it rejected the Dillon stan-
dards as inadequate measures to limit liability.'28
Since Dillon the guidelines have evolved from flexible parame-
ters of liability to carefully refined requirements, as other jurisdic-
tions have interpreted those guidelines to provide better guidance
to the courts. The Iowa Supreme Court recently accepted Dillon
foreseeability as the appropriate test in bystander cases, but not
without altering the Dillon test.12 9 In Barnhill v. Davis, the court's
most dramatic change was to reduce Dillon's maindated but vague
"close relationship" between the bystander and the plaintiff to
that of "husband and wife or related within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity."' 30 As another guarantee of the genuine-
ness of the claim, the court required that the plaintiff bystander
actually fear that the victim would be seriously injured or killed
and that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would also
believe so.1s3 Finally, the bystander's emotional distress must be
"serious." The court clarified that term by requiring the distress to
be accompanied by physical symptoms. 3 2 New Jersey closely par-
allels Barnhill in its requirements of a familial relationship except
that the death or serious injury must be to the victim as opposed
to the person viewing the injury producing event. 33
126. McGovern v. Piccolo, 372 A.2d 989 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Grimsby v. Sampson,
530 P.2d 291 (Wash. 1975).
127. 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
128. Id. at 560-61.
129. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981).
130. Id. at 108.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 107-08.
133. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980).
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In a factual setting strikingly similar to Dillon, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Sinn v. Burd"3' forcefully rejected the
reasoning of the New York court and overruled its own formula-
tion of the zone of danger test enunciated in Niederman v. Brod-
sky. 3 " Foreseeability, the court reasoned, produced more equitable
results than the zone of danger test in bystander cases and it rea-
sonably circumscribed the area of liability.136 The Sinn court also
emphasized the importance of a familial relationship between the
victim and plaintiff and granted recovery in that case because the
victim was the plaintiff's child. The court chose not to decide, how-
ever, if recovery would be granted for a more remote
relationship. 37
New Hampshire has also rejected both the impact rule and the
zone of danger test in favor of the traditional tort concept of fore-
seeability.'3 8 In Corso v. Merrill, the plaintiff parents were granted
recovery for the mental distress they suffered upon seeing the body
of their daughter immediately after she was struck by a car. 39 The
court applied the Dillon guidelines closely to the facts before it
and found that the parents had contemporaneously perceived the
accident. ' ° The court varied little from the guidelines except to
require the plaintiff's emotional harm to be serious and "accompa-
nied by objective physical symptoms."'
With some variation, most jurisdictions adopting Dillon require
close compliance with that decision's guidelines," 2 but for Massa-
chusetts, Dillon was clearly inadequate. In Dziokonski v.
Babineau,"3 the plaintiff died as a result of the shock she suffered
after arriving at the scene of her child's accident."' The court re-
fused to adopt either the impact rule or zone of danger test,14 5 stat-
ing that reasonable foreseeability was the only appropriate method
134. 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979).
135. 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970).
136. Sinn, 404 A.2d at 686.
137. Id. at 686 n.21.
138. Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979).
139. Id. at 302.
140. Id. at 307.
141. Id. at 308.
142. See Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Corso v. Merrill,
406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); Landreth v. Reed, 570
S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
143. 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978).
144. Id. at 1296.
145. Id. at 1300.
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of measuring liability in bystander cases." 6 Of the several factors
to determine foreseeability,"7 the court held that the plaintiff may
recover without alleging the contemporaneous sensory observance
mandated in Dillon.'" Although the court specifically declined to
follow that Dillon requirement, it did require a plaintiff to arrive
on the scene of the accident while the injured person is there. 49
The district court in Champion curiously includes both the Dil-
lon test and the key Dziokonski language abrogating the contem-
poraneous sensory observation requirement.' One interpretation
of this combination suggests that perhaps the Dziokonski language
was meant to modify and add substance to the Dillon guidelines.
But any attempt to synthesize the Dillon and Dziokonski language
leads to confusion and uncertainty.
Dillon asserts that it is much more foreseeable that a plaintiff
located near the scene of an accident will suffer mental distress
than one located a distance away. 5 ' Conversely, Dziokonski is ob-
livious to this "near-far" analysis and allows recovery for both a
plaintiff at the scene and one arriving "soon" after the accident,
regardless of the distance he had to travel.'52 Furthermore, Dzi-
okonski directly collides with Dillon's contemporaneous sensory
observance requirement. While the Champion court may have
meant to modify the Dillon "contemporaneous observances" stan-
dard to include observations made shortly after the accident, it is
clear that in California "soon comes on the scene" does not mean
"contemporaneous." Dillon also requires a sensory observance of
the accident which Dziokonski specifically excuses by allowing re-
covery to plaintiffs who arrive too late to sensorially perceive the
accident. It seems the only reconcilable similarity between the two
decisions is the consideration of the degree of relationship between
the victim and plaintiff.
Faced with the confusion Champion engenders, the supreme
146. Id. at 1302.
147. The court required: 1) substantial injury and proof of causation between the injury
and defendant's negligence; 2) "where, when and how" the plaintiff learned of the injury
should be considered; 3) the degree of relationship between the injured party and plaintiff is
relevant. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. But see Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980),
which goes beyond Dziokonski to allow recovery even where plaintiff first sees the victim's
injury in a hospital.
150. Champion, 420 So. 2d at 353-54.
151. Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
152. Dziokonski, 380 N.E.2d at 1302.
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court must choose between the Dillon and Dziokonski standards if
it adopts the foreseeability analysis. As the Dillon guidelines tend
to deny recovery under factual settings similar to Champion, and
merely replace one arbitrary standard with another, the better
choice is Dziokonski.
E. Physical Injury
Regardless of the applicable standard for measuring liability, the
Restatement and most jurisdictions, including Florida, require that
the emotional distress manifest itself in some type of physical in-
jury before recovery can be granted.1 53 The physical injury require-
ment satisfies two concerns of the courts. First, in reasoning remi-
niscent of decisions based on the impact rule, physical injury
"serves as a screening device to minimize a presumed risk of
feigned injuries and false claims." 54 Secondly, physical injury also
acts to limit the scope of the defendant's potential liability. 155 A
fundamental problem with the physical injury approach is the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing between physical and mental injuries. 156 If
the injury is characterized as mental, then recovery is denied. The
uncertain nature of some injuries has resulted in considerable con-
fusion as to how they should be categorized.15 7
Generally, if the physical manifestation of the injury can be
medically verified, it may be classified as a physical injury. Gradu-
ally, courts granted recovery for a variety of emotional distur-
bances and disorders by classifying them as physical injuries.5 8
Other "physical" injuries have included such uniquely emotional
disorders as neurosis and shock. 159
153. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979); Kuhr Bros. Inc. v. Spahos, 81
S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980); Aragon v.
Speelman, 491 P.2d 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A
(1965).
154. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (Cal. 1980). See
PROSSER, supra note 21, at § 54.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, comment b (1965).
156. Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 44 P. 320, 322 (Cal. 1896).
157. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress: The Case for an Independent
Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 n.24 (1971). [hereinafter cited as Independent Tort).
158. E.g., Baxter v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. 1979).
159. E.g., Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). Additionally,
the courts are divided in granting recovery if the defendant's negligence fails to produce an
immediate physical injury. See Humphries v. Delta Fire & Casualty, 116 So. 2d 130 (La.
App. 1959) (as long as causation can be traced between the emotional distress and physical
injury, no immediate injury required). But see Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1958)
(immediate physical injury emphasized).
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To date, only a handful of jurisdictions have rejected the physi-
cal injury requirement. 6  The courts permitting recovery for
purely emotional injury claims recognize that the distinction be-
tween emotional and physical injuries is artificial and is contra-
dicted by the results of medical research in the field of emotional
injuries."6' Medical experts agree that mental and physical injuries
are not distinct types of harm, in that physical symptoms may be
manifestations of mental distress.1 62
Hawaii was the first jurisdiction to abandon the physical injury
requirement. 63 In Rodrigues v. State, the state road department
negligently failed to clear drainage culverts causing storm waters to
flood the plaintiff's home. 64 Although the plaintiff did not witness
the negligent event, the court granted recovery for the shock the
plaintiffs experienced on finding their home flooded. More impor-
tantly, the court allowed recovery despite an absence of any physi-
cally manifested injury. The Rodrigues court held that a duty ex-
ists to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious emotional
distress and that an individual's interests in freedom from this
type of harm is entitled to independent legal protection. 65 The
court found that the duty extends to those individuals who are
threatened by one's negligent conduct but "only with respect to
those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unrea-
sonably dangerous." '166 Recovery for serious mental distress is per-
mitted "where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be
unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by
the circumstances of the case.', 67 Rodrigues is admittedly distin-
guishable from the usual mental distress case in that the mental
injury arose from damage to property. However, a few years later,
160. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 167 Ca. Rpt. 831 (Cal. 1980); Leong v.
Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Hawaii 1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Wal-
lace v. Coca-Cola Bottling, 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
161. See Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 7, 11-13 (1957).
162. Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 157, at 1259.
163. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Hawaii 1970). Hawaii's lead was recently followed
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444
A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). In Culbert, Maine expressly adopted the Dillon foreseeability test and
abandoned the physical injury requirement, stating "[p]roof of physical manifestations of
the mental injury is no longer required as a part of the plaintiff's cause of action, and the
decision in Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., Me., 269 A.2d 117 (1970), is overruled
so far as it holds otherwise." 444 A.2d at 438.
164. Id. at 513.
165. Id. 520 (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 521.
167. Id. at 520.
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Hawaii explicitly abolished the physical injury requirement where
a plaintiff suffered shock without physical manifestation when he
saw his grandmother killed by the defendant's car. The court in
Leong v. Takasaki'6 8 adopted the Rodrigues reasonable man stan-
dard and held that damages for emotional distress are recoverable
without physical impact or physical injuries. 69
California has also demonstrated a willingness to dispense with
the physical injury requirement.17 0 In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals,17 1 the plaintiff's wife was negligently misdiagnosed as
suffering from infectious syphilis. The defendants instructed her to
inform the plaintiff of the diagnosis and to seek treatment. The
wife erroneously suspected the plaintiff of having engaged in an
extramarital sexual relationship and her hostility toward him de-
stroyed their marriage. The California Supreme Court found the
Dillon test to be "apposite, but not controlling."' 7 2 In granting re-
covery, the court characterized the plaintiff as a "direct victim" of
the negligence.173 While foreseeability would still be the applicable
standard in "direct victim" cases, the formal Dillon guidelines are
relevant only in third-party bystander settings where the plaintiff
suffers mental distress at the sight of injury to another. 174
The Molien court was highly critical of the physical injury re-
quirement. It is illogical, the court reasoned, to presume that emo-
tional distress is less debilitating than physical injury and, there-
fore, less deserving of compensation. 7 5 It also ridiculed the
recognized distinction between physical and mental injury. 7 6 By
its very operation, the physical injury requirement defeats its own
purpose of screening fraudulent claims. The rule is overinclusive,
as the most trivial physical injury permits recovery. Similarly, it is
underinclusive in that legitimate mental distress which fails to
168. 520 P.2d 758 (Hawaii 1974).
169. Id. at 765.
170. See Note, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California Expands Liability for
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 33 HASMNGs L.J. 291 (1981); Note Negligent In-
fliction of Emotional Distress Absent Physical Impact or Subsequent Physical Injury, 47
Mo. L. REv. 124 (1982).
171. 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (Cal. 1980).
172. Id. at 833.
173. Id. at 834.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 838.
176. The court stated: "the attempted distinction between physical and psychological
injury merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof; whether the plaintiff
has suffered a serious and compensable injury should not turn on this artificial and often
arbitrary classification scheme." Id. at 839.
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manifest itself physically will be dismissed promptly. 177
Problems of proof militate against wider rejection of the physical
injury requirement. California and Hawaii courts are satisfied with
this vague proof formulation: "[T]he general standard of proof re-
quired to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of
genuineness in the circumstances of the case." '178 The plaintiff has
the option to prove his case through expert medical testimony1 79 or
lacking such evidence, prove the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury to the jurors, who rely upon their own experience
to determine if a reasonable person would have been emotionally
injured by the defendant's act.1 80 The jury may consider other ju-
dicially recognized guarantees of genuineness, such as physical in-
jury or outrageous conduct accompanying intentional infliction of
mental distress. 81
The use of the reasonable man standard to determine the genu-
ineness of the plaintiff's mental distress has serious shortcom-
ings. 8' The standard was not intended to measure the injuries a
plaintiff would reasonably experience; it was meant to determine if
a particular defendant was negligent. 183 Secondly, "[b]y ignoring
the predisposition of the plaintiff, the reasonable man standard
conflicts with the general rule that 'the defendant who is negligent
must take his victim as he finds him.' "184
Medical science has provided the courts with more appealing
methods of measuring the severity of the mental distress than the
reasonable man standard. Mental distress caused by negligence is
essentially a reaction to a traumatic stimulus which "may be de-
fined as an impact, force, or event which acts upon an individual
for a brief or extended period of time and can be either physical or
purely psychic."' 85 These stimuli can trigger either primary or sec-
177. Id. at 838.
178. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520.
179. Molien, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 837.
182. See Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Cause of
Action in California: Do Defendants Face Unlimited Liability? 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
181, 196 (1982).
183. Id. at 196.
184. Id. at 197.
185. Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 157, at 1248 (citing Brickner, The Psy-
chology of Disability, in TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 65 (P. Can-
tor ed. Supp. 1964); Laughlin, Neuroses Following Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND
SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 76, 77 (P. Cantor ed. 1962); Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury,
Traumatic Psychoneurosis, And Law, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L .REV. 428, 430 (1957)).
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ondary emotional reactions.186 The primary reaction occurs auto-
matically and instinctively as the individual confronts the stress he
experiences from the defendant's negligence.18 7 It "is exemplified
by such emotional responses as fear, anger, grief, shock, humilia-
tion, or embarrassment." ' The effects of primary reactions can be
quite transient. The medical expert would have to resort to conjec-
ture to establish a causal connection between the emotional dis-
tress and the defendant's negligence because the symptoms are
generalized.189 Additionally, the hypothetical nature of the proof
required increases the possibility of fraudulent claims.
Secondary reactions are traumatic neuroses which develop from
the primary reactions as the affected individual demonstrates
"continued inability to adequately adjust to a traumatic event."' 90
These reactions are comparatively more serious'91 than primary re-
actions and they produce symptoms that are real and identifiable
and which may be severely disabling. 92 One solution may be to
classify these secondary reactions as physical injuries and permit
recovery. That view ignores the fact that these reactions are clearly
emotionally based; they must "be distinguished from true physical
injuries since they cannot be explained by an actual physical im-
pairment.11 93 As secondary reactions can be objectively measured,
the burden of proof is greatly eased because the court need only
determine what the plaintiff actually suffered.
It may be argued that the primary-secondary approach will lead
to a battle of the medical experts as each side presents expert
opinion classifying a reaction as either primary or secondary. This
kind of conflict is common in the judicial system, and the courts in
other areas of law have been able to resolve it." 4 Given the objec-
tive differences between the categories, the courts will find the
classification of an emotional injury as either primary or secondary
186. Id. at 1249.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Note, Negligent Infliction of Serious Emotional Distress Is Cognizable In Califor-
nia As an Independent Tort and an Averment of Physical Injury Is No Longer Necessary
to Support the Action; an Alleged Emotional Injury to a Plaintiff's Spouse Will State a
Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium by the Plaintiff. 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 200, 208 (1981).
190. Comment, Independent Tort, supra note 157, at 1250.
191. Id. Secondary reactions may result in nervousness, nausea, weight loss, pains in the
stomach, genito-urinary distress, emotional fatigue, weakness, headaches and backaches. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1251.
194. See Smith, The Ideal Use of Expert Testimony in Psychology, 6 WASHBURN L.J.
300, 305 (1967).
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much easier than attempting to cling to the artificial physical-emo-
tional dichotomy.
Secondary reaction emotional distress should be recognized by
the courts. The court in Champion gave little attention to the
physical injury requirement because it was not at issue in the case.
It merely cited language from Dziokonski requiring a substantial
physical injury in addition to the foreseeability approach.' 95 The
physical injury requirement is vulnerable to many of the same crit-
icisms the Champion court leveled at the impact and zone of dan-
ger tests. Should it be confronted with the physical injury require-
ment issue in the future, the Florida Supreme Court should
recognize that granting recovery for the secondary reactions of
pure emotional distress would be a timely improvement.
CONCLUSION
The court in Champion v. Gray should be lauded for its attempt
to abolish Florida's outmoded impact rule. The reasons supporting
the rule have become so weak that serious debate no longer focuses
on the merits of the rule itself. Rather, the attention of courts, as
in Champion, should turn to the standard that will replace the im-
pact rule.
The Florida Supreme Court has the opportunity to choose from
many variations on the foreseeability approach that have been cre-
ated over the last fifteen years. The most troubling aspect of the
Champion decision is its failure to look beyond Dillon to other for-
mulations of foreseeability that provide recovery for the negligent
infliction of mental distress in factual scenarios closer to
Champion.
If the court adopts an unaltered version of Dillon, there is no
assurance that our courts will not follow California's example and
transfer the contemporaneous sensory observation guideline into
an artificial barrier. Such a development would preclude any fu-
ture Mrs. Champions from recovery which is a result the Cham-
pion court would surely wish to avoid.
The Champion court makes a reading of its decision much more
difficult by combining the mutually exclusive tests of Dziokonski
and Dillon in its opinion. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will give
less consideration to Dillon, as the Dziokonski analysis provides a
better approach to compensating plaintiffs who arrive after the
195. Champion, 420 So. 2d at 353 (citing Dziokonski, 380 N.E. 2d at 1302).
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accident.
The Supreme Court should expand Champion's determination
of duty to include more than simply foreseeability. By referring to
the policy considerations that traditionally determine duty, the
courts can more equitably assess liabilities and damages.
Ultimately, the supreme court may wish to consider recognizing
the negligent infliction of mental distress as an independent tort
and eliminate the physical injury requirement. The court should
provide recovery for pure mental distress which can be classified as
secondary reactions and can be objectively measured.
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